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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Roberta L. Coles 
Ms. Coles is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
S ociologists have generally ap-proached economic change in Pal-estine-the area now divided into Israel, the West Bank and Gaza-
through various models: the traditional co-
lonial theory; dependency; integration into 
the capitalist system; dualism, which in this 
case argues that the two sectors (the mod-
em, capitalist Jewish sector and the tradi-
tional, non-capitalist Arab sector) devel-
oped separately, either unaffected by one 
another or with positive spillover effects 
from the Jewish sector into the Arab sector. 
Some Israelis have also used interdepen-
dency concepts to explain interaction be-
tween the two sectors; that is, they argue 
that the two sectors are mutually beneficial. 
In application, each of these models alone 
fails to explain Palestine's economic devel-
opment, or rather lack thereof. 
Because . of the many geopolitical 
changes Palestine has encountered during 
the last two centuries, its development has 
probably incorporated some aspects of all 
of these theories at various times. There-~ore, although the main focus of this study 
ts on the Occupied Territories (or Adminis-
tered T 't · 
will b . em one.s, as the Israelis prefer), I 
t nefty revtew some of the main fea-ures of ec · h . . 
. onomtc c ange tn Palestme, first 
tn the Ottom . d . . 1917. s an ~no , whtch lasted until 
' ~cond, dunng the British Mandate, 
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which terminated in 1948; and then in the 
period from 1948 to 1967, when the territo-
ries were under Jordan's and Egypt's rule. 
This backward glance will provide a con-
text of contrast and historical perspective. 
A few problems are encountered in such 
a study. Due to the various political inter-
ests in the area, it is sometimes difficult to 
know how researchers define the borders of 
the territories, particularly those of the 
West Bank (or Judea and Samaria, as they 
are called by Israelis). Because Israel an-
nexed East Jerusalem, Israeli researchers 
often exclude East Jerusalem from their 
figures for the territories, while Arab and 
most outside researchers include it, as the 
annexation is illegal under international 
law. Also, some studies are ambiguous as 
to whether Jewish settlement · activities are 
being included and how different the figures 
would be if the settlements were not in-
cluded. 
Moreover, Gaza is less often the focus of 
research than is the West Bank. In this 
context, the territories will be treated cor-
porately, except where the case of Gaza is 
different or particularly noteworthy. In 
many ways, Gaza's experience is worse in 
degree than in kind, due to high population 
density (second only to China, 85 percent 
urban) and the fact that Gazans do not have 
the benefits of citizenship and·passport (and 
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hence mobility) from Egypt that West 
Bankers do from Jordan. 
During the mid-nineteenth century, as a 
result of European industrialization, Pales-
tine · was increasingly brought into the cap-
italist system. The coastal and inland plains 
were cultivated, and production was in-
creasingly geared toward external markets. 
Exports grew rapidly, and by the 1870s far 
outweighed imports. 1 The revenues from 
the substantial export surplus helped to 
finance the Ottoman public debt before 
Zionist contributions entered the picture. 
From 1856 to 1882, Palestine's main ex-
ports were wheat, barley, dura, sesame, 
olive oil, soap, oranges, and various other 
fruits and vegetables. Although at 'first 
these were marketed regionally to Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria and Greece, they were in-
creasingly exported to France and England. 
During the American Civil War, cotton was 
also a primary export, but after the war's 
resolution, cotton production declined to a 
standstill. 
According to consular reports, this re-
markable economic upswing was mani-
fested in growing prosperity. Although, as 
is usually the case, the direct producers 
(the farmers) did not benefit as much as the 
landholders, merchants, etc., consular re-
ports testify that hoarding and buying of 
tangible investments, such as jewelry, did 
occur among the peasants. 2 
While this introduction to the world mar-
ket enhanced export revenues and pro-
1Roger Owen, ed. ,Studies in the Economic and 
Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois 
Press, 1982), p. 20; but see Haim Gerber, "Modern-
ization in Nineteenth-Century Palestine-The Role of 
Foreign Trade," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 18, no. 
30, p. 259. He says that imports outweighed exports 
but that Zionist money transfers accounted for a good 
portion of imports. 
2Alexander.Scholch, "The Economic Development 
of Palestine, 1856-1882," Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol. 10, no. 3, p. 53. 
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duced a vigorous economy, there was a 
flipside to this coin. True to the classical 
model of the international flow of commod-
ities, Palestine also became a docile market 
for consumer -goods. Rice, sugar, coffee, 
cotton manufactures, timber, wine, petro-
leum (from the United States) and coal 
were among the imported goods. Luxury 
items were aimed mostly at European resi-
dents, but they also reflected a growing 
consumer economy. 
Domestic industries were hurt by the 
influx of European goods, which, due to the 
industrial revolution, could be produced 
much more cheaply than the traditional 
products of the Arabs. The new availability 
of gas lamps snuffed out the indigenous 
candle-wax producers, and gasoline cans 
and well-digging destroyed the earthenware 
industry. The textile industry, however, 
adapted by converting to cheaper, lower· 
quality items. Due to the problems of ship-
ping pottery· (fragile) and leather (bulky), 
these two local industries managed to sur· 
vive . The soap industry remained un· 
scathed because Arab soap was produced 
from olive oil (no animal fats) and, ther~­
fore, continued to be in demand in IslamiC 
countries. The building industry flourished, 
however, and a few new industries-tour· 
ism, hotels, antiques, law, and photogra· 
phy-ar~se in response to the developm~nt 
of communication and transportation 
Iines.3 
It is helpful to note here that the Ot~o­
mans instituted several land laws dunng 
this period that enhanced foreign participa· 
tion and laid the ·foundation for later 
colonization, 4 though increased revenues 
seems to have been the intention of these 
laws.5 
3Gerber, pp. 251-255. . . ion and 
4Alexander Scholch " European Penetrat 82 ,, 
- ' ' 1856-18 I the Economic Development of Palestme, . 
in Owen, p. 56. 1 ws and 
· 
5For a more thorough accounting of these a 
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Three waves of land laws (in the late 
1850s, late 1860s, mid-1870s) worked · to-
1 &ether to enable individuals to dispose of 
land and resulted in large landed properties. 
Peasants who were deluged with tax, debt 
sought wealthy investors to buy village 
lands ·(sometimes whole villages) and pay 
oft'these debts. In most cases, however, the 
peasants were still allowed to cultivate the 
land. In general, three groups of people · 
purchased the land: notables, the new bour-
geoisie of Christians and Jews and Euro-
pean proteges, and foreign colonists (pri-
marily the German Templars and Jews, 
who exported mainly wine and cognac). 
However, as Zionist (as · opposed to the 
previously Jewish capitalist) land pur-
chases increased, more cultivated land was 
bought and more families were dispos-
sessed. By 1929, 29.4 percent of the peas-
ants had lost their land to Zionist 
settlement. 6 
· • · as Zionist (as opposed to 
the previously Jewish 
~Pitalist) land purcha.ses 
IDcreased, more cultivated 
land was bought and more 
fiDlilies were dispossessed. By 
1929, 29.4 percent of tlie . _ .
PtasanZio • ts had lost their land to 
rust settlement. 
. Throughout this period, although ·exports 
lllereased, both the agricultural and manu-
---
~·&~----------------------------------------------------NabJa lllte~retation and effects, .see Owen above; als<;> 
eatine· Zub1, "The Development of Capitalism in Pal-
Proct • The Expropriation of' the Palestinian Direct 
4 pPuC:," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 13, no. ~·. 109; and Raja Shehadeh, "The Land Law of 
2 IIPtineS2," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 11, no. 
' . -99. 
'Zubi, p, 99. 
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facturing sectors still maintained a healthy 
degree of diversity and local orientation, 
which enabled the economy to weather 
natural crop failures. The increase in pro-
duction was due not to the intensification or 
modernization of methods, but to the ex-
tension of area under· cultivation. Never-
theless, one can see that the foundation had 
been laid for transforming Palestine into a 
peripheral economy. 
Although sociologists have interpreted 
the British Mandate period as a colonial 
period in Palestine, this colonialism had 
some atypical characteristics-:-the primary 
one being that the principal goal of the 
Mandate was to establish a national home 
for the Jews in Palestine. This indicated 
that British interests were not supreme. 
Moreover, because Palestine was not a 
treasure trove of raw materials nor a ripe 
opportunity for-industrial investment, Br:it-
ish interests appear to have been more 
political and strategic. 
At this historical juncture, dualistic the-
ories enter to assay the period starting with 
the Mandate and extending through the 
present time. Propounders of this view, 
mostly Israelis, say that in Palestine 
two· autonomous and rival national com-
munities ... went about their separate col-
. lective institutional and social lives, turning 
Palestine into a binational dualistic entity .. 
.. One was the low-income, primarily rural, 
and relatively backward Arab economy, 
and the other was the relatively modem, 
high-income, and urban Jewish economy.' 
According to these thinkers, both sectors 
were growing, but the Jewish sector grew 
7Jacob Metzer and Oded Kaplan, "Jointly but Sev-
erally: Arab-Jewish Dualism and Economic Growth in 
Mandatory Palestine," Journal of Economic History, . 
vol. 4S, no. 2, p. 328; see also Eliezer B. Ayal, "Arab 
Labor in Palestine and Beyond Within a Two Sector 
Development Model," Middle East Reports, vol. 15, 
nos. 3-4, pp. 53-61. 
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faster due to external inputs. Discounting 
dispossessed Arab peasants, the dualists 
say the Jewish sector grew without expense 
to the .Arab sector and perhaps to its ben-
efit. 
During this period, Jewish productivity 
grew nearly twice as fast as Arab produc-
tivity. Arab exports to the Jewish sector 
grew from 9. 3 percent of Arab net product 
in 1921 to 14percent in 1935. If we include 
land sales, exports grew from 13.9 percent 
to 24.5 percent. Payments for land transfers 
accounted for one-third of intersectoral 
transactions, and according to Metzer and 
Ayal these capital gains promoted growth 
in the Arab economy.s Between 1931 and 
1937, 529 new Arab enterprises ~~e esti-
mated to have started, but these were no 
competition for the larger Jewish enter-
prises. Arab transport and trade services 
were used extensively by Jews, and Arab 
building materials fed expanding Jewish 
construction. However, due to Zionist pro-
hibitions, the use of Arab labor in the 
Jewish economy was still relatively small, 
but such use was more common in private 
Jewish industries. Israeli sociologists point 
to this opportunity for wage labor as one of 
the spillover benefits to the Arab sector, 
but as Nabla Zubi points out, much of the 
unemployment had been created by Zionist 
land deals in the first place. By World War 
II, 40 percent of Arab labor was wage 
labor.9 
The Jews who immigrated during this 
period were mostly skilled Europeans who 
transferred large sums of capital with the 
intention to invest in farms, industry and 
trade. The Jewish sector obviously used 
niore capital-intensive, advanced technol-
ogy. This did affect, for instance, the Arab 
olive-oil industry, ·which could not compete 
with the large-scale industry of the Jews 
81bid., pp. 339-40. 
9 Ayal, p. 56. 
and their ability to import cheaper olive oil 
from other countries. Moreover, the Jewish 
industrial sector had pressured the British 
to make ·several changes in land and tax 
laws, one of which was to lift duties on 
imported olive oil and sesame seed.1o How-
ever, after the Arab rebellions in the 1930s, 
the British rescinded some of the tax and 
tariff changes that had benefited the Jewish 
sector and purt the Arab sector. 
The Histadrut, the Zionist trade union, 
also pressured the British to employ a guar-
anteed quota of Jews. Because the Arabs 
were unorganized, Jews were able to se-
cure from the British higher wages than the 
Arabs. In addition, after 1935 real wages for 
Arabs declined more rapidly than those for 
Jews. 11 
After the 1948 War and the creation of 
the state of Israel, the part of Eastern 
Palestine (what is now called the West 
Bank) which had not been subsumed into 
the Israeli state was annexed by Jordan, 
and the Gaza Strip was annexed by Egypt. 
For the West Bank, this meant it was cut off 
from the markets and ports in the coastal _ 
and northern areas. With the influx of ref-
ugees, Jordan's East Bank almost _doubled 
in population, and the government's eco-
nomic policies favored East Bank develop-
ment:· In 1948 the East Bank, with its cap-
ital city Amman, had been less developed 
than the West Bank, but by 1967, the re-
verse was true. Nevertheless , some 
sources say that by 1966 the West Bank had 
7,300 industrial establishments, 48 percen} 
of both Banks, contributed 20 percent 0 
Jordan's aggregate GNP, and was generat-
ing an annual growth rate of 6-8 percent per 
capita. 12 Tourism, which flourished under 
10Sarah Graham-Brown "The Political EconomY of 
. the Jabal Nablus, 1920-48:" in Owen, pp.' 97, 140. 
78 
111bid: , p. 151. u 
-
12Yusif A. Sayigh, "The Palestinian Econom~ ~: 
der Occupation: Dependency and PauperizatJOn, 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XV , no. 4, P· 61. 
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Jordanian rule, probably accounted for 
many of these industries. 
Financed by Jordan and outside charita-
ble organizations, education increased in 
importance, and the brain drain began. 
Since much education was obtained abroad 
and jobs follqwed, the area became depen-
dent on external transfers of dollars. Fortu-
·nately, Jordan was able to provide a good 
deal of local employment in the public 
sectors, teachers, bureaucrats and other 
civil service jobs, which helped keep some 
professionals at home. 
However, after the 1967 war, Israel oc-
cupied the West Bank and Gaza arid insti-
tuted a number of policies, regulations and 
military orders that have greatly affected 
the economy of the territories. 
The most conspicuous and controversial 
. of its policies has been land confiscations.B 
Of the West Bank's 5.8 million ·dunums (1 
dunu~ = approximately 1/4 ·acre), Israel · 
now controls at least 40 percent, or 52· 
percent of cultivable land.t4 Israeli settle-
ments occupy about 170,000 dunums and 
are mostly agricultural in nature. Forty 
per~ent of the Jordan Valley, which is very 
fertile land, is in Israeli hands.•s In Gaza, 
Israel has confiscated about 34 percent. 
Land confiscation has been implemented 
~Y means of a number of orders that mod-
ified the laws in existence at the time of 
~~pation. Among the first orders was 
~tary Order~~· 58, whic.h .vest~d in the 
ands of the military administration (the 
Custodi · of . . . ~ of Absentee Property) all lands 
mdtvtduals not present on the date of 
l)So . 
One me have ~ven ventured to call this land reform. 
at P8Per on mass settlement in Israel was presented ! COnference on land reform. 
Paw · A . Banlc · Zl • Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West 
l9SS) ~ Gaza Strip, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
'p. 60. . 
UEmii 
·cultural e Sahliyeh, "West Bank Industrial and Agri-
of Pal ~velopment: The Basic Problems," Journal 
estrne Studies; vol. 11, no. 2, p. 65. 
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occupation. Military Order No. 25 prohib-
ited any land transactions from occurring 
without approval of the Custodian, who 
was given wide powers of ownership. Mil-
itary Order No. 59 took possession of state 
land (a particularly controversial category, 
as "state land," by traditional definition, 
was cultivated by families for many gener-
ations and includes village- or communally-
held grazing lands16). Lands were also 
closed and confiscated for security, mili-
tary, and public purposes, but often these 
lands are eventually given to settlers , since 
Israel considers settlers to be part of its 
security strategy .11 
In numerous cases when Arabs 
have refused to sell or give up 
their land, authorities or 
settlers have resorted to 
destroying crops and closing 
off tracts of land during the· 
night. 
In addition, Military Order No. 291 
halted all title settlement procedures. These 
procedures had started under the Mandate 
and continued under Jordanian rule, but 
only one-third had been settled by 1967.ts 
Israeli authorities have also started insert-
ing a clause in building permits to the effect 
that while the Palestinian applicant has per-
mission to build a house on the land, the 
land does not belong to him. This latter 
tactic has been applied mainly in urban 
areas. 19 
16See Shehadeh. 
17
"Twenty Years of Confiscating Land," Al-Fajr, 
June 14, 1987, pp. 8-9. 
18 Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the 
Occupied Territories (New York: United Nations, 
1985), p. 6. 
19Ibid.' p. 4. 
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Civilians were given permission to buy 
land, but after speculation occurred, this 
practice was curtailed. In numerous cases 
· when Arabs have refused to sell or give up 
their land, authorities or settlers have re-
sorted to destroying crops and closing off 
tracts of land during the night. 20 
Closely related to land expropriation has 
been the Israeli settlement policy. Immedi-
ately after the war, the Israeli government, 
headed by Labor at that time, established 
eight military outposts (which developed 
into settlements) in the Jordan Valley (the 
most fertile area of the West Bank), numer-
ous settlements in and around Jerusalem, 
and one in Gaza. Settlement establishments 
continued to increase so that by 1977, when 
the Likud government came to power, 
there were 5,000 settlers in 36 settlements. 
Currently there are about 150 settlements 
on the West Bank and 18 in Gaza. · 
Settlement strategy has been to surround 
and isolate Palestinian communities, hin-
dering organized action and rendering the 
carving out of a Palestinian homeland 
nearly impossible. Settlements are also of-
ten located on hilltops, and situated in a 
way to gain access to the eastern water 
aquifer, tne only aquifer Israel had not yet 
tapped by 1967. 
The settlements pose an illustrative con-
trast of how Israeli revenues for the terri-
tories are distributed. The Israelis have 
spared no cost when it comes to the settle-
ments. Most settlements are fully equipped 
and connected to . the Israeli · water and 
electrical grid. And when settlements failed 
to fill up as quickly as the government had 
20See Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Economic Con-
sequences of the Occupation," in Naseer H. Aruri, 
ed., Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (Belmont, MA: 
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, · 
1983); p. 176; and Baruch Kimmerling, "The Reopen-
ing of the Frontiers, 1967-82," in Ernest Krausz, ed., 
Politics and Society in Israel, (New Brunswick: Trans-
action Books; 1985), vol. III, p. 100. 
hoped for, they resorted to subsidy. For 
example, the 1983-4 settlement budget 
called for $470 million, in addition to the 
$80-$100 .million that would go to settler 
subsidies. Land was given to developers at 
nominal cost. Buyers received interest-
free, non-indexed loans and outright 
grants. 21 Moving trucks and credit cards for 
electricity, water, food seeds, and fertiliz-
ers are supplied to newcomers.22 
The Israelis can truthfully boast of infra-
structural improvements in the Occupied 
Territories, but these improvements have 
been designed to facilitate Jewish settle-
ment. An elaborate grid of roads has been 
built to connect the settlements to one 
another and to Israel. 
Electricity is another matter of concern. 
The West Bank has long been serviced by 
the Jerusalem Electric Company, a Pales-
tinian company, but the Israeli Electric 1 
Company has now required the JEC to 
relinquish its servicing of the settlements. 
Because Israel refused to grant the JEC , 
p~rmission to purchase more generating . 
equipment, the JEC was some $30 million 
in debt from having had to purchase current 
from the IEC.23 
Israeli water policies have been another 
problematic area. Water resources have 
. bee'n pla~~d under direct responsibility of 
the Israei Water Commission. There are 
three main aquifers in the West Bank, lo-
cated in the north, west and east. Even 
before 1967 Israel was tapping the western 
and n·orthern aquifers, but after 1967 Israel 
was also able to pump from the eastern one. 
The total annual water supply on t~e 
West Bank is about 850 million cubtc 
meters. About 100-120 mcm of that is con- , 
21Merle Thorpe, Jr., .Prescription for Conftic: 
(Wa~hington, D.C.: ·Foundation for Middle Eas 
· Peace, 1984), p. 35. 
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22Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 175. ,, 
23
"JEC Board, Workers Disagree on New Plan, 
Al-Fajr, Jan. 3, 1988, p. 3. 
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sumed by Palestinians. Before 1967 Israel 
was consuming more than 60 percent of the 
West Bank's water, which accounted for 
about 55 percent of Israel's total supply. 
Now it takes about 80 percent of West 
Bank water.24 Israel draws another 9 mcm 
per year from the River Jordan, endanger-
ing the Jericho springs. 
Shortly after 1967, Israel destroyed 140 
water pumps in the Jordan Valley and, for 
its settlements, has since drilled at least 25 
new wells, all suitable for irrigation, caus-
ing springs and wells in neighboring Arab 
villages to dry up. In 1977-78, the 17 wells 
of Jordan Valley settlements pumped 14.1 
mcm, while the 106local wells pumped 12.1 
mcm.2s This has had catastrophic effects on 
crop yields. According to a recent article in 
AI Fajr (December 13, 1987) entitled 
"Jordan Valley Spring Goes Dry," in 1987 
in the village of Al-Ouja, only 2,000 of the 
normal9,000 dunums of land could be cul-
tivated. In 1985, some villagers had to pay 
as much as $18,000 to supplement their 
irrigation-water supply. In addition, Israel 
denies permission for Palestinians to drill 
wells for agricultural purposes. Instead, 
meters have been affixed to wells to enforce 
limitations on Arab irrigation. Settlements 
have no restrictions placed on water usage. 
The coastal aquifer which serves Gaza is 
overly exploited by Israel and now suffers 
from salination from the Mediterranean. 
Unlike the West Bank, where only 4 per-
cent of agriculture is irrigated, in Gaza, 45 
percent of agriculture is irrigated, so water 
restrictions and salinity have greatly hurt 
~ers.26 In 1984, Gazan · settlers con-
sumed about 30-60 mcm annually, while the 
total Palestinian populati~n in Gaza con-
sumed about 100 mcm. 
u .. W t -
198 a .er Politics," The Middle East, February 1, p. 54. USabli -
26u yeh, p. 66. 
Water Politics,'' p. 54. 
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These land, water and settlement policies 
have worked together to debilitate the Pal-
estinian economy, which was agriculturally 
based. About half of the 5.8 million dunums 
which make up the West Bank are cultiva-
ble. About 70 percent of farmers own their 
land; the rest are tenant farmers. Arab 
farmers still rely mostly on labor intensive 
crops, while Israeli farms rely on capital 
intensive. Palestinian farmers have adopted 
some mechanization. For example, in 1967 
there were 147 tractors in use and by 1977, 
there were 1 ,534. The use of Israeli seed 
stock and fertilizers is up from 4,000 tons in 
1968 to 15,100 in 1976.27 But this is not a 
generalized trend. Fertilizers don't respond 
well in water-stressed conditions; the shal-
low, rocky ground is not conducive to 
mechanized tilling;2s and all these inputs 
and technology must be purchased through 
Israel, whose high inflation is reflected in 
their cost. -
[Arab] farmers must obtai~ 
permits to plant trees and 
vegetables, and Israel has 
rarely issued permits to plant 
new trees or even to replace 
old trees. 
Since 1967, the Israelis have imposed 
restrictions' on which crops Arab farmers 
grow and where they market their produce. 
They cannot grow crops that compete with 
Israeli produce. Farmers must obtain 
permits to plant trees and vegetables, and 
Israel has rarely issued permits to plant 
new trees or even to replace old trees. 29 
27Graham-Brown in Aruri, pp. 186-187. 
281. Amon and M. Raviv, From Fellah to Farmer 
(Rehovot, Israel: Settlement Study Centre, 1980), p. 
62. 
29 Ann M. Lesch, "Gaza: Forgotten Comer of Pa-
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Therefore, the Arabs' poultry, melon and 
pumpkin exports, once strong, collapsed 
after 1967. The Israelis did introduce onion 
seeds into the West Bank because they 
would not compete with Israeli farmers, but 
then the ·onions were exported through 
Israel.3o · 
Gaza was refused permission to open a 
canning factory to make use of its under-
sized oranges, which are more prevalent 
now due to the salination of the water, the 
lack of irrigation, and the restrictions on 
replacing old trees.3t 
Under Israel's ''open bridges'' policy, 
exports to Jordan are encouraged. The 
main exports now are oranges, olive oil and 
vegetables. Watermelons, pumpkins and 
some grains used to be exported, but tliese 
are now imported.32 
Most of Arab agricultural produce is sold 
fresh directly at local markets. And be-
cause there is only one food-processing 
plant (a tomato paste factory in Hebron) on 
the West Bank, timing is an important fac-
tor in Arab exports. The frequently im-
posed town curfews, market closings, and 
roadblocks can be and have been detrimen-
tal to family income. 
On the other hand, Israeli produce, 
which is usually cheaper, floods the mar-
kets of the territories. In 1980-81, of a total 
87,797 tons of vegetables for sale in West 
Bank markets, 22,930 tons came from Is-
rael. Of fruits, melons and pumpkins, 
32,095 tons of the 62,207 total were from 
Israel. In Gaza that same year, 16,036 of 
43,691 tons of vegetables and 22,800 of 
33,476 tons of fruit were from Israel.33 
Industry in the territories is besieged by a 
number of problems. Raw materials are 
lestine," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol XV, no. 1, 
p. 47. 
30 Arnon, p. 69, and Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 189. 
31Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 188. 
32Sahliyeh, p. 68. 
33Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 189. 
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scarce in the West Bank, and so they must 
be imported. Of .the raw materials used in 
industry, 24 percent originate in the West 
Bank, 61 percent come from Israel and 15 
percent from abroad. 34 
Arab banks were barred from reopening 
after 1967, and until recently Israel had 
refused permission to open new banks. The 
recent exception is the Cairo-Amman 
Bank, which opened. in the West Bank in 
September 1986, but this bank is lending 
only to merchants and requires excessive 
guarantees.Js Therefore, Palestinians in the 
territories must rely on Israeli banks, which 
charge high interest rates in the territories. 
Foreign transfers must also go through Is-
raeli banks. Therefore, there are no loan 
facilities, credit, or banking services. 
Moreover, because Israeli products are 
freely marketed in the · territories, Arab in· 
dustry finds it difficult to compete with 
comparatively cheap Israeli goods. (Israeli 
goods are subsidized sometimes up to 60 
percent.) In fact, the West Bank and G~ 
are the second largest importers of Israeli 
goods. In 1983, the territ!tries imported 
$680.5 million of Israeli goods, while the 
United States imported $1,329.2 million 
from Israel's total exports of $?,5,1~.3 
million. 36 The value of the territones ID· 
dustrial imports is seven times that of its 
agricultura,l imports, reflecting the dearth of 
industry in the t~rritories. . 
Israel imports 73 percent of the ternto-
ries' commodities (which is six times more 
than the amount of the agricultural prod· 
ucts it imports from the territories), bu~ 
most of these commodities are reexP?rte d 
Israeli goods which had been unfi.rus~ 
goods subcontracted to the territones ~ 
cause of low labor costs.37 In fact, mos 
34Sahliyeh, p. 59. ant 
35''Twenty Years of Occupation _Breeds StagD 9 ' 
Dependent E~onomy," Al-Fajr; May 17, 1987, P· · 
36Sayigh, p. 47. 
371bid.' p. 48. 
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Palestinian crafts are sold to Israel, labelled 
"Made in Israel," arid then sold abroad. 
The lack of raw materials and financing 
and the competition from Israeli goods, 
combined with the uncertain political status 
of the territories, make investment in indus-
try undesirable. It is no surprise then that 
industry in the territories has declined. 
Even though the percentage of Arab 
wage labor is increasing, West Bank indus-
try employs only 13-15 percent of the West 
Bank labor force, compared to 22.2 percent 
in 1963. The industrial sector now contrib-
utes about 6. 7 percent to the territories' 
GNP, compared to 8.7 percent in 1966. By 
the late 1970s industrial firms numbered 
around 2,587, two-thirds were in auto re-
pair, blacksmithing, carpentry, cement and 
stone. The rest were in sewing, weaving, 
leather and plastic.Js Tourism has declined, 
as Israeli restrictions on Arab travel agen-
cies and their lack of access to advertising 
have drawn tourists away from the territo-
ries. And ·restrictions on building in the 
te~tories have meant that the local con-
.struction industry is not allowed to respond 
to the growing demand for housing. 
In contrast to the lack of investment in 
the Arab industrial sector, by 1983 the 
I.sraelis had built six industrial parks (total-
ling 1,260 dunums) in the territories and 
were planning seven more (totalling 15,010 
dunums), primarily to give employment to 
the ~ettlers. One;..half of all the workers in 
the largest industrial · park are Jews em-
ployed in _military installations.39 Although 
these require heavy financing, government 
money has been readily available. Entre-
. Preneuts inside Israel can sell their-present 
business at a high profit and receive a free 
plot in the industrial parks in the 
territories. 40 
las . 
39 ~Yeh, p. 58. · 40J~~mg Conditions . . . , pp. 22, 27. 
ld., p. 26. 
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Because of the poor outlook in agricul-
ture and industry, many families left farm-
ing or supplement their income by wage 
labor in Israel. Immediately after the war, 
labor from the territories was prohibited by 
Israel, but when the Israeli economy expe-
rienced an upswing and labor officials saw 
that cheap migrant labor would fill jobs that 
Israelis didn't want, the restrictions were 
dropped. 
. . . more than half of the 
territories' labor force is 
engaged in the Israeli 
economy. 
In 1983, 37.8 percent of the territories' 
labor force (32.7 percent from the West 
Bank and 46.5 percent from Gaza) worked · 
in Israel (compared to 13 percent in 1970).41 
These figures do not include illegal employ-
ment, which has been estimated to be as 
high as 20,000, or another 15 percent. The 
majority of those employed in Israel are in 
construction. Another 15,000 are in sub-
contracting businesses (construction, furni-
ture, textiles and metals).42 Together, that 
means more than half of the territories' 
labor force is engaged in the · Israeli 
economy. 43 
Conversely, employment in the territo-
ries declined from 88 percent in 1970 to 62 
percent in 1983.44 The largest loss of local 
labor has been in agriculture, which de-
clined from 44.8 percent in 1969 to 28 
percent by the late 1970s, and 26 percent 
41Sayigh, p. 49 . . 
42Sahliyeh, p. 61. 
43See Moshe Semyonov and Noah Lewin-Epstein, 
Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water (New York: 
ILR Press, 1987) for a study on the effects of migrant 
labor on the Israeli labor force. 
44Living Conditions .. . , p. 16. 
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for 1983.4.5 The proportion of the labor force 
in industry has remained level, reflecting 
the lack _of in<;tustrial development. 
Few, if any, Palestinian laborers are en-
gaged in strategic branches of any ~ector or 
in ·a highly skilled capacity (except con-
struction}. They commute into Israel daily 
(laws prohibit staying overnight, though 
some do so surreptitiously). And for some, 
especially Gazans, commuting itself may 
take up to 20 hours a week. 46 
Official Arab laborers have the same 
taxes withheld as the Israeli laborer, but 
they do not receive the same benefits. 
When they are entitled to benefits, they 
receive them in the territories, where facil~ ~ 
ities, such as hospitals, are of lower 
quality. 47 This certainly must contribute to 
the high numbers of illegal workers, who 
would rather not have money withheld 
from which they reap no benefit. 
Hospitals, research centers, coopera-
tives, etc. which could absorb labor are few 
and undersupported. Those social, health 
and educational institutions that exist do so 
primarily from transfers of external philan-
thropic organizations. But even these come 
under Israeli restrictions. For instance, 
ANERA [American Near East Refugee 
Aid], which receives dollars from 
U.S.A.I.D. and is one of the least restricted 
non-governmental organizations in Israel, 
had projects for a hospital, electrification, 
and agricultural co-ops disapproved in 
1979'.48 . 
By 1974, earnings from Israel accounted 
for one-fourth of the territories' GNP. 49 
Remittances account for about one-third. 
Before .1973, per-capita consumption grew 
at an annual average rate of 6. 7 percent on 
4
'Ibid., p. 18. 
46CJarfield H. Hom, "Gaza's Labour Trap," IDRC 
Reports, October 1986, p. 5. 
47Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 209. 
48lbid.~ p. 221. 
49Gabriel, p. 255. 
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the West Bank and 6.4 percent in Gaza, 
accounting for 72 percent of domestic uses 
in the territories (compared to 54-59 per-
cent in Israel, Jordan, Egypt or Syria).50 
While many dualists point to this as a sign 
of prosperity in the population, such a high 
figure also reflects the lack of investment in 
the territories. 
The absence of a centralized government 
has had its socio-economic effects also. 
Obviously, the governmental void means a 
lack . of public-sector jobs, lack of planning 
and development schemes, coordination 
and institutions. Some have tried to orga· 
nize locally. For instance, in the mid-l970s 
the National Guidance Council, a group 
intended to deal with development issues, 
formed, but many of its members were 
arrested, exiled or debarred from public 
office.st Trade unions have experienced a 
similar demise. Such organizations are sub· _ 
ject to search, seizure and closure. 
One can see that Palestine does not fit 
neatly into any one of the various develop- 1 
ment theories. The traditional colonial theo-
ries don't fit because Britain didn't act pri· 
marily in its own interests in Palestine, as. it 
did in its other colonies, such as Indta. 
Instead, it played the role of facilitator for 
Zionist interests. Perhaps . the concept of 
"internal colonialism" comes closer be· 
cause it incorporates the additional aspects 
of dispossession and displacement of the 
population and is carried out by a power 
now within the area; perhaps the closest 
parallel in this instance would be South 
Africa. Dependency theory seems not ~n­
tirely appropriate. because the territones 
lack the sovereignty ~nd geograp~cal se~r 
ration of center and periphery that IS usu Y 
. d d . t' And for· present m epen ency s1tua Ions. . . 
eign investment a major element ID d~pen 
dency theory, i; missing in the terri tones. 
. .solbid. 
'
1Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 216. 
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Although the territories began their inte-
gration into the capitalist system early in 
the nineteenth century (a booming econ-
omy period that stage-theorist Rostow 
might consider a "take-off''), a total re-
structuring of the territories' agricultural 
system is still incomplete; though the econ-
. omy is much more export-oriented, it is still 
somewhat traditional and diverse. Thirty 
percent is sharecropping, and land holdings 
are generally small. In fact, the territories 
are largely cut off by Israel from direct 
integration with the world system. The ter-
ritories have been used to facilitate the 
capitalist world system, while not becom-
ing fully a part of it. 
The dualistic and interdependency mod-
els depicted by Israeli sociologists seem 
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euphemistic at best. During both the Man-
date period and the occupation period, 
there was extensive interaction between 
the two sectors and the "spillover" effects 
obviously have not been to the benefit of 
the traditional sector. 
In short, it's theoretically safe to say that 
the territories have been systematically un-
derdeveloped by an outside power (Zi-
onism) which itself eventually became a 
pivotal part of the area (Israel). Israel's 
policies in the territories obviously are in-
tended to work for the benefit of the Jewish 
state. Whether the economic conditions of 
the territories can be reversed and rehabil-
itated, and under what geopolitical arrange-
ment, is the conspicuous question still beg-
ging an answer. 
